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The Law of Presumptions: A Look
at Confusion, Kentucky Style
By ROBERT G. LAwsON*
I. INTRODUCTION
Professor Wigmore's attempt to explain the law of pre-
sumptions and burden of proof was preceded by an observation
most appropriate to the problem:
The difficulties of such an attempt, almost insuperable,
arise not so much from the intrinsic complication or uncer-
tainty of the situation as from the lamentable ambiguity of
phrase and confusion of terminology under which our law
has so long suffered.1
Stimulation for this statement was probably more associated with
presumptions than burden of proof. Over the years the term
"presumption" has been used by virtually all courts to "designate
what are more accurately termed inferences or substantive rules
of law."2 It has also been used as a "loose synonym for presumption
of fact, presumption of law, rebuttable presumption, and irrebut-
table presumption." 3 To this list the Kentucky Court of Appeals
had added mandatory presumption, presumptive evidence, and
prima facie case. Perhaps of more significance than the indiscri-
minate use of terminology is the extent to which courts have used
"presumptions" to describe judicial reasoning of various kinds and
to perform chores more appropriate to unrelated procedural de-
vices. As a result of the misuse of this concept, its real utility has
been immersed in almost hopeless confusion. In this article, an
effort is made to demonstrate this confusion as it exists in Kentucky
and, by doing so, to provide a framework within which presump-
tions can be made to perform the rather simple functions for which
they were created. Essential to this effort as a matter of background
Assistant Professor of Law, University of Kentucky.
19 J. WIGMoBE, EvmEN cE § 2485 (3d ed. 1940) [hereinafter cited as Wic-
MORE].2 Subrin, Presumptions and Their Treatment Under the Law of Ohio, 26 Omo
ST. L.J. 175, 176 (1965).
8 Id
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is a thorough discussion of the burden of proof concept to which
the next two parts of the article are devoted.
II. BURDEN OF PROOF-CIVIL LITIGATION
A. Introduction
Adopting Wigmore's analysis, the Court of Appeals has divided
burden of proof into two distinct responsibilities related to the
process of persuasion:
The term 'burden of proof is used commonly as applying
to two kinds of situations. First, the risk of nonpersuasion;
second, the duty of going forward with evidence.4
In civil litigation, the second responsibility is more significant
than the first. It requires that sufficient evidence be introduced to
persuade the trial judge that there exist factual issues in the case
worthy of a jury's consideration. Until this is accomplished, one of
the litigants must operate under threat of a premature termination
of litigation by way of a directed verdict. Describing the quantity
of proof necessary to satisfy this responsibility has proven to be
among the most difficult problems encountered by courts in apply-
ing the burden of proof concept. An examination of the Ken-
tucky cases involving this problem serves to demonstrate the
hopeless manner in which lawyers frequently struggle to rise
above word ritual.
In the very early cases, the standard used to determine whether
the duty of going forward with evidence had been satisfied was
stated as follows: "[W]here there is any evidence to sustain an
issue the question is for the jury."5 The inadequacy of this standard
becomes apparent when considered in light of the purpose for
which the "duty of going forward" was created. As stated by Wig-
more, this aspect of the burden of proof was developed to enable
the judge, "as a part of his function in administering the law...
to keep the jury within the bounds of reasonable action." 6 Ful-
4 Galloway Motor Co. v. Huffman's Admr, 281 Ky. 841, 851, 137 S.W.2d
879, 384 (1940).
5 Anderson Mfg. Co. v. Iring Transfer Co., 248 Ky. 91, 100, 58 S.W.2d 254,
258 (1933). Accord, e.g., Marz v. Hess, 19 Ky. L. Rptr. 42, 39 S.W. 249 (1897);
Lingenfelter v. Louisville & N.R.R., 9 Ky. L. Rptr. 116, 4 S.W. 185 (1887);
Nichols v. Chesapeake, 0. & S.W.R.R., 8 Ky. L. Rptr. 519, 2 S.W. 181 (1886).
69 WiGmoRE § 2487.
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fillment of this objective would not be possible should "any
evidence" be sufficient to sustain a jury's decision on a disputed
issue. In recognition of this, the Court of Appeals, in its later
cases, attempted to rephrase its standard of measurement to more
accurately represent the power of a trial judge to pass initially
upon the proof. Evidence sufficient to create a jury issue was de-
fined as "testimony of substance and relevant consequence; not
vague or uncertain, but having the quality of proof or fitness to
induce conviction of truth."7 These words supposedly conveyed
to the minds of trial judges and lawyers the quantity of evidence
necessary to establish a jury issue. Perhaps they did. But Locke's
observation would likely have been that "words, being voluntary
signs,... cannot be voluntary signs imposed by [man] on things
he knows not. That would be to make them signs of nothing,
sounds without signification.""
To further complicate the task of a trial judge, the Court of
Appeals developed, concurrent with the above standard, the
principle that a directed verdict could be avoided simply by in-
troducing a "mere scintilla of evidence."9 In applying this princi-
ple, the Court at first reverted back to the original standard of
measurement by stating that "an issue should be submitted to the
jury where there is any evidence, even though slight, tending to
sustain it."'10 Then, as had been done before, the principle was
restated to reflect a greater power in the trial judge to take a
case from the jury. In this restatement, evidence under the
scintilla rule was defined as "something of substance, and not
mere vague, uncertain, or irrelevant matter, not carrying the
quality of proof, or having fitness to induce conviction."'1 As
an encore to this act, the Court of Appeals abandoned this
7 Louisville & N.R.R., v. Lefever's Adm'x, 288 Ky. 195. 200, 155 S.W.2d
845, 847 (1941). Accord, Clark v. Young's Ex'x, 146 Ky. 377, 142 S.W. 1032(1912).
8 2 J. Lo=nu, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding 9 (Ann. by A. C.
Fraser 1959).
9 E.g., Sympson Bros. Coal Co. v. Coomes, 248 Ky. 324, 58 S.W.2d 594(1983); Stanley's Adm'r v. Duvin Coal Co., 237 Ky. 813, 36, S.W.2d 630 (1931);
American Dist. Tel. Co. v. Oldham, 148 Ky. 320, 146 S.W. 764 (1912); Bannon
v. P. Bannon Sewer Pipe Co., 136 Ky. 556, 119 S.W. 1170 (1909).10 Kentucky Util. Co. v. Wiggins, 254 Ky. 629, 636, 72 S.W.2d 12, 15 (1934).
11 Newman v. Dixon Bank & Trust Co., 205 Ky. 31, 86, 265 S.W. 456, 458
(1924). Accord, e.g., Wynn v. Gover, 268 Ky. 562, 105 S.W.2d 636 (1937);
Duff v. May, 245 Ky. 709, 54 S.W.2d 4 (1932); Park Cir. & Realty Co. v. Ringo's
Guardian, 242 Ky. 255, 46 S.W.2d 106 (1932).
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standard of measurement altogether: "[A] mere scintilla of
evidence is not sufficient to take a case to the jury.'2
However, efforts to provide a yardstick for this purpose con-
tinued. In recent years, the Court has ruled at one time or another
that a jury must be given an opportunity to decide an issue if the
proof on that issue could be described as "evidence of substance,"' 3
"evidence of probative value,"'14 or evidence which "substantially
tends to support a cause of action."1u But the measurement now
used most frequently in passing judgment upon the validity of a
directed verdict is contained in this statement:
[W]hen we find a verdict to be flagrantly against the
weight of the evidence, the complaining party is entitled to
a directed verdict.16 (Emphasis added).
To be "flagrantly against the [weight of] the evidence," a verdict
must be "so unsupported by proof and so overwhelmingly con-
tradicted as to force the conclusion that it was the result of passion
and prejudice on the part of the jury."' This standard possibly
provides an intelligible guide with which trial judges can perform
their task. More probably, along with its forerunners, it indicates
that the Court is groping for words to define that which is nearly
indefinable. In either event, the end result of the Court's total
effort to describe the role of the burden of going forward with
evidence is literally hundreds of confusing and uncertain judicial
opinions.
The one characteristic common to all the above standards is
that each is framed, although somewhat obscurely, in terms of a
quantity of evidence. None is framed in terms of a degree of
mental conviction. Yet, in passing upon the sufficiency of proof, the
12Coney Island Co. v. Brown, 290 Ky. 750, 755, 162 S.W.2d 785, 788
(1942). Accord, e.g., Faulkes v. Brumnett's Adm'r, 805 Ky. 484, 204 S.W.2d 493(1947); Morehead & N.F.Ry. v. Crawford, 296 Ky. 636, 178 S.W.2d 14 (1944);
Cloversplint Coal Co. v. Blair, 287 Ky. 158, 151 S.W.2d 1052 (1941); Lyons v.
Southeastern Greyhound Lines, 282 Ky. 106 137 S.W.2d 1107 (1940).
13 Thomas Jefferson Fire Ins. Co. v. Barter, 251 S.W.2d 862, 863 (Ky. 1952).
14Kentucky Transp. Corp. v. Spurlock, 854 S.W.2d 509, 512 (Ky. 1961).
15 Current v. Columbia Gas, 888 S.W.2d 139, 142 (Ky. 1964).16 Life & Casualty Ins. Co. v. Knight, 279 S.W.2d 10 (Ky. 1955); Accord,
e.g., Kentucky Power Co. v. Dillon, 845 S.W.2d 486 (Ky. 1961); Taul v. Com-
monwealth, 249 S.W.2d 45 (Ky. 1952); Slusher v. Blanton, 296 Ky. 422, 177
S.W.2d 878 (1944); Louisville Ry. v. Prather, 290 Ky. 791, 162 S.W.2d 780
(1942).
'7 Cloversplint Coal Co. v. Blair, 287 Ky. 158, 159, 151 S.W.2d 1052, 1058(1941).
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trial judge must gauge that proof in terms of the extent to which
it convinces him of the existence or nonexistence of the disputed
proposition. And, since he does this only with a view toward keep-
ing the jury within the "bounds of reasonable action,"' 8 his mental
response in each instance should be one of these three: (1) That
no reasonable juror could find the existence of the fact in issue;
(2) that reasonable jurrors could differ as to the existence or non-
existence of the fact in issue; or, (3) that no reasonable juror
could find the nonexistence of the fact in issue. By structuring the
burden of going forward in terms of these responses, the burden of
proof concept could be applied with much less difficulty and con-
fusion than presently exists. To demonstrate this, and to provide a
framework within which to discuss presumptions, the following
diagram may be utilized:19
0%o PLAINTIFF'S SCALE 100%
% 70%
(Response 1)(Responst! 2) (Response 3)
Probability of Existence
100% DEFENDANT'S SCALE 0%
70 30%0
(Response 1) (Response 2) (Response 3)
Probability of Nonexistence
Figure I: Diagram Depicting Burden of Proof in Civil Litigation.
18 9 WIGMoaE § 2487.
19 A diagram similar to this was used first by Wigmore to describe the burden
of proof concept. Id. His diagram, however, was not constructed to provide an
answer to the difficult question concerning the sufficiency of proof essential to
acquire or avoid a directed verdict. Another attempt to diagram "burden of
proof" was made by Professor McNaughton. McNaughton, Burden of Production
of Evidence: A Function of a Burdn of Persuasion, 68 HAnv. L. BEv. 1382
(1955). His diagrams were not simple enough to make possible elimination of
the almost insuperable confusion that has developed in connection with the burden
of proof idea. The diagram used in this article is designed to provide the needs
unsatisfied by the previous ones.
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Each response listed above is represented on this diagram as a
"range of probability values falling between two points."20 The
first is represented on the Plaintiff's Scale as 0 to 30 percent range
of probability and on the Defendant's Scale as 70 to 100 percent
range of probability; the second is represented on both scales as
30 to 70 percent range of probability; and, the third is represented
as 70 to 100 percent range on the Plaintiff's Scale and 0 to 30 per-
cent range on the Defendant's Scale. Representing the responses
as probability ranges conforms to the notion that the function of
a trial judge is not to decide whether the disputed fact exists, but
only whether the proof can form a reasonable basis for a jury
decision, should the jury be permitted to decide. Placing each
response on both scales of the diagram represents the idea that a
judge's "determination of the degree of probability of the exist-
ence of a fact necessarily implies a simultaneous determination of
the complementary degree of probability of non-existence of the
fact."' 21 (Emphasis added). (For example, if the judge should
determine that the existence of the fact in issue is 30 percent
probable, his determination would necessarily imply that the non-
existence of the fact is 70 percent probable). By treating the
probability ranges of Figure 1 as hypothetical representations of
the quantity of proof which will serve to elicit from the trial judge
one of the foregoing responses, the burden of proof concept can be
more easily understood.
B. Burden of Going Forward With Evidence
At the outset of a trial, one of the parties (assumed in Figure
1 to be the Plaintiff) must bear the responsibility of initially
presenting proof on the proposition in issue. This responsibility
is described above as the duty of going forward with evidence.
Until it is satisfied, the party who must bear it is subject to a
response from the judge that no reasonable juror could find the
existence of the proposition asserted to exist (Response 1, Figure
1). The consequence of such a response, as indicated before, is a
directed verdict for the other party (assumed in Figure 1 to be
the Defendant). To avoid this consequence, the Plaintiff must
produce sufficient evidence to convince the judge that reasonable
2 0 McNaughton, supra note 19, at 1886.
21 Id. at 1383.
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jurors could differ as to the existence or nonexistence of the
proposition in issue (Response 2, Figure 1). The minimum
amount of evidence necessary to achieve this degree of conviction
is hypothetically represented on the Plaintiff's Scale of Figure 1 as
30 percent probability of existence.22
In the process of satisfying this initial responsibility, the Plain-
tiff may do more than merely convince the judge that reasonable
jurors could differ in their determination of the issue. He may be
able to introduce enough proof to persuade the judge that no
reasonable juror could find the nonexistence of the proposition in
dispute (Response 3, Figure 1). The minimum amount of evidence
necessary to warrant this response is hypothetically represented on
the Plaintiff's Scale as 70 percent probability of existence. If this
degree of probability is established (or stated more correctly, if
Response 8 is elicited), the trial judge is obligated to place the
Plaintiff "in the same position that was occupied by the [De-
fendant] at the opening of the trial."23 The burden of going for-
ward with the evidence is shifted to the Defendant, and, under
threat of an adverse ruling, he must introduce enough evidence to
once more convince the judge that reasonable jurors could differ
as to the existence or nonexistence of the fact in dispute. The point
at which this degree of conviction is achieved is represented on the
Defendant's Scale as 30 percent probability of nonexistence. This
degree of probability once again takes the issue away from the
judge and places it into the hands of the jury. It remains in the
jury's hands until the defendant introduces enough evidence to
achieve the 70 percent probability of nonexistence level, which
serves to again elicit from the judge a response that no reasonable
juror could find the existence of the proposition in issue (Re-
sponse 1, Figure 1). If the defendant achieves this degree of con-
viction with his proof, the burden of going forward with the
evidence is shifted back to the plaintiff and the above-described
process starts again.24
22 As the diagram of Figure 1 is designed, the 30 percent probability level
could be more accurately described as 30 percent plus an infinitesimal amount of
additional probability. The same is true of the 70 percent probability-of-existence
level and the 30 and 70 percent probability-of-nonexistence levels. The additional
probability avoids the problem of having the diagram depict two separate responses
from the judge on the basis of the probability at the 30 and 70 percent levels.
23 9 WIGMORE § 2487.
24 Id.
19681
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This process by which the burden of going forward is shifted
back and forth between the parties naturally ceases after both have
produced all their evidence. The judge must then make his final
assessment of the proof. If, in making that assessment, he becomes
convinced that reasonable jurors could differ as to where the
balance of probability lies, then the case must be submitted to the
jury for decision. At this point in the proceedings, the burden of
going forward loses its significance and disappears from considera-
tion. The other responsibility of the burden of proof concept then
comes into operation.
C. Risk of Non-Persuasion
This responsibility serves to impose upon one of the litigants
the burden of persuading the jury that the proposition asserted
possesses the required degree of probability, which is usually de-
scribed as "a preponderance of evidence." Most often, it is imposed
upon the party first having the burden of going forward with
evidence on the proposition in issue. And, unlike the burden of
going forward, this responsibility is said to never shift.25
As construed by the Kentucky Court of Appeals, this aspect of
the burden of proof concept has a very limited role in the judg-
ment process of civil cases. Its greatest limitation has been imposed
by cases which provide that jury instructions should not contain
the expression "preponderance of evidence"2 6 and should not state
which party has the burden of persuasion. Instead, the trial court
is expected to so "frame the instructions as to indicate on whom
the burden of proof lies." 28 The manner in which this is achieved
is the factor which limits the significance of the risk of non-per-
suasion. Consider for example a case in which the existence or non-
existence of Fact A and Fact B is the disputed issue. If the risk of
non-persuasion is to be imposed upon the plaintiff, the instruction
would be framed as follows: "If you believe from the evidence
that Fact A and Fact B exist, the law is for the plaintiff and you
must decide in his favor." On the same issue, if the risk of non-
25 See 9 WicMoRa § 2489; Laughlin, In Support of the Thayer Theory of
Presumptions, 52 MicH. L. REv. 195 (1953).26E.g., Swopshire v. Commonwealth, 246 Ky. 593, 55 S.W.2d 356 (1932);
Louisville & N.R.R. v. Allen's Adm'r, 174 Ky. 786, 192 S.W. 863 (1917).2 7 E.g., Cincinnati, N.O.&T.P. Ry. v. Halcomb, 32 Ky. L. Rptr. 381, 105 S.W.
986 (1907).28 Mills v. Louisville & N.R.R., 116 Ky. 309, 316, 76 S.W. 29, 31 (1903).
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persuasion is to be imposed upon the defendant, the instruction
would be in these words: "Unless you believe from the evidence
that Fact A and Fact B exist, the law is for the plaintiff and you
must decide in his favor." Perhaps an ordinary juror, being un-
trained in the law, could appreciate the distinction between these
two instructions. Perhaps he could not. In either event, the under-
lying purpose of the risk of non-persuasion in civil cases should be
satisfied. Each of these instructions provides the jurors with a rule
of law which decides the issue for them in those rare instances
when their mental convictions are in balance, i.e., the existence of
the disputed fact is believed to be as probable as its nonexistence.
In civil litigation, the risk of non-persuasion merits no greater
significance 2 9
III. BURDEN OF PROOF-CRIMINAL LITIGATION
A. Introduction
Judicial trials are designed to reconstruct a specific factual
incident or situation. But no matter how regulated or disciplined
this reconstruction process becomes, it must operate without the
benefit of a scientific yardstick for searching out the truth. Con-
sequently, in a criminal case, if the issue of guilt or innocence is
seriously contested, some degree of doubt as to the truth of the
charges must inevitably remain after the reconstruction process has
been completed. This imperfection in the process has created two
conflicting needs. The first is the need for society to impose its
sanctions upon an accused without resorting to absolute or mathe-
matical certainty of guilt. The second is a need for a means of pro-
tection against the intolerable injustice of convicting the innocent.
Efforts to reconcile these needs have culminated in the require-
ment that no man can be convicted of criminal conduct in the
absence of proof which convinces the decision-makers of his guilt
"beyond a reasonable doubt." This requirement has a substantial
influence upon both responsibilities of the burden of proof concept
in criminal litigation. Its influence upon the most significant of
the two, the risk of non-persuasion, is discussed first.
29 See James, Burdens of Proof, 47 VA. L. REv. 51 (1961).
19683
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B. Risk of Non-Persuasion
In its broadest application, the "reasonable doubt" concept
serves to impose upon the prosecution the burden of persuading
the jury of the defendant's guilt. In doing this, it performs a more
important function of particularizing the categories in which the
jury's response to the evidence must be made. Although these
categories may be rather complex in some cases, the manner in
which they are affected by the requirement that guilt be estab-
lished beyond a reasonable doubt may be demonstrated by this
simple diagram:
INNOCENCE GUILT
Figure 2. Diagram Showing Response Categories In Criminal Trial.
This two-category scale with open ends is used to represent the
idea that the extremes of judgment are unlimited,3o and that the
jury has no responsibility to determine degrees of "guilt" or "in-
nocence". The only point of significance on the scale is the bound-
ary between the two categories. It is significant only because it can
be shifted to the right by defining guilt in such a way as to require
a high degree of probability for conviction. Such a shift serves to
increase the size of the innocence category and correspondingly
decrease the size of the guilt category. For example, if the jury
should be instructed that guilt can be established only by proof
to an absolute certainty, and if an assumption is made that abso-
lute certainty is attainable by human judgment, the response cate-
gories, with a probability scale added, could be depicted as follows:
G
U
INNOCENCE I
L
T
0% Probability of Defendant's Guilt 100%
Figure S. Response Scale Requiring Absolute Certainty of judgment.
80 See JOHNSON, THE PSYCHOLOGY oF THouGnT AND JuDmmENT 326 (1955).
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As demonstrated by this diagram, the influence of this instruction
upon the response scale would be such that almost no guilt re-
sponses could be expected.
In instructing jurors that guilt must be established "beyond
a reasonable doubt," courts have attempted to shift the boundary
between the response categories of Figure 2 to the right so as to
give the accused some advantage over the prosecution. To achieve
this objective, some have assumed that the phrase, "beyond a rea-
sonable doubt," can be rendered more intelligible by definition,
and have ruled that an accused is entitled to have its proper
meaning and application delineated.31 In performing this task,
some judges have defined the concept affirmatively, using such ten-
uous phrases as "a substantial doubt,"32 "a doubt based upon rea-
son,"3 3 or "a doubt which would cause an ordinary and prudent
person to hesitate and pause." 34 Others have defined it negatively:
"reasonable doubt is not a vague, speculative, imaginary doubt"; 3
"proof beyond a reasonable doubt does not mean proof to an abso-
lute or mathematical certainty"; 3 or, "it is not a captious or pos-
sible doubt. t3 7 Still others have reverted to language discarded
long ago by the Supreme Court, stating that "beyond a reasonable
doubt means to a reasonable or moral certainty."38 The net result
of all efforts to make the concept more transparent to jurors has
been an endless quibbling in the appellate courts over the effect
of obscure and meaningless words.
Because of this, other courts, including the Kentucky Court of
Appeals, have taken a different approach, one that imagines the
existence of such a connection between the "reasonable doubt"
phrase and the signification attributed to it that no juror can help
31 E.g., Williams v. United States, 271 F.2d 703 (4th Cir. 1959); Mundy v.
United States, 176 F.2d 32 (D.C. Cir. 1949).32 E.g., United States v. Heap, 345 F.2d 170 (3d Cir. 1965); Hopper v.
United States, 216 F.2d 684 (10th Cir. 1954).3 3 E.g., United States v. Davis, 328 F.2d 864 (2d Cir. 1964); Holland v.
United States, 209 F.2d 516 (10th Cir. 1954).
34E.g., Scurry v. United States, 347 F.2d 468 (D.C. Cir. 1965); United
States v. Harris, 346 F.2d 182 (4th Cir. 1965); Jones v. United States, 338 F.2d
553 (D.C. Cir. 1964).35 E.g., United States v. Johnson, 343 F.2d (2d Cir. 1965); Bishop v. United
States, 107 F.2d 297 (D.C. Cir. 1989).36 E.g., McGill v. United States, 348 F.2d 791 (D.C. Cir. 1965); Scurry v.
United States, 347 F.2d 468 (D.C. Cir. 1965).37 E.g., Hooper v. United States, 216 F.2d 684 (10th Cir. 1954).38 E.g., United States v. Molin, 244 F. Supp. 1015 (D. Mass 1965); Holland
v. United States, 209 F.2d 516 (10th Cir. 1954).
1968]
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but understand its meaning.89 The fault with this approach, if any,
is that even in the minds of the communicators the phrase does not
represent a precise idea. No one could reasonably profess to know
the extent to which the innocence category is enlarged by the
reasonable doubt instruction. Probably, it is dependent partly
upon the gravity of the offense being tried. In a murder case the
boundary between the response categories could be expected to be
more to the right of center than in an assault case. Thus, a greater
degree of probability would be required for a conviction of
murder.40
Other than this, little can be said about the influence of the
reasonable doubt instruction on the response categories. It is quite
possible that the Court of Appeals is correct in its assertion that
jurors generally understand what is mean by "reasonable doubt."'1
Without additional explanation, the phrase may serve to caution
the jury that an accused is not to be convicted on the basis of a
mere balance of probability but only on a showing of very high
probability. At the same time it should imply that absolute cer-
tainty in human judgment is beyond expectation. As indicated
earlier, these are the functions which it is expected to perform.
C. Burden of Going Foward With Evidence
The notion that underlies the operation of the burden of going
forward with evidence in civil litigation is equally applicable to
criminal trials.4 Before a jury may pass upon the evidence that has
been presented, the prosecution must introduce sufficient proof to
persuade the judge that a verdict by that jury would have a
"reasonable" basis. In describing the quantity of proof necessary
to satisfy this responsibility, the Court of Appeals has used
virtually the same standards which have been employed in civil
cases. In the early cases, the standard was stated as follows: "[I]f
there is any evidence, however slight or circumstantial, which
89 See, e.g., People v. Van Dyke, 414 Il1. 251, I1 N.E.2d 165 (1953);
Brooks v. State, 52 So. 2d 616 (Miss. 1951); Simms v. State, 203 Ga. 668, 47
S.E.2d 862 (1948); State v. Cavener, 356 Mo. 602, 202 S.W.2d 869 (1947).40 It may be that this feature of the jury system is not dependent at all upon
the reasonable doubt concept. The mental attitude of jurors may be such that
the graver the consequences of their decision, the more caution they can be
expected to exercise in making that decision. A reminder to do so may be un-
necessary, an instruction to do otherwise ineffective.4 See Frierson v. Commonwealth, 175 Ky. 684, 194 S.W. 914 (1917).42 See Noah v. Commonwealth, 273 Ky. 272, 116 S.W.2d 315 (1938).
[ l. 5 ,
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tends to show guilt of the crime charged ..... it is the trial court's
duty to submit the case to the jury."43 On other occasions, the
Court has stated that evidence is sufficient to satisfy the prose-
cution's burden of going forward only if it is "so unequivocal and
incriminating as to exclude every reasonable hypothesis of in-
nocence."44 And, finally, the Court has ruled that a criminal case
should not be submitted to the jury if a verdict of guilty would be
"so flagrantly against the evidence as to shock the conscience or lead
to a belief that the verdict was the result of prejudice on the part
of the jury."45
Despite the similarity of standards, the burden of going for-
ward does not operate in a criminal case as it does in a civil case.
Its principal differences may be shown by the use of a diagram
patterned after that of Figure 1:
Prosecution's Scale
0%o 50 100%
(Response 1) (Response 2)
Probability of Existence
Defendant's Scale
10% 50% 0
(Response 1) (Response 2)
Probability of Nonexistence
Figure 4: Burden of Going Forward With Evidence-Criminal Litigation.
431Harlan v. Commonwealth, 2,53 Ky. 1, 10, 68 S.W.2d 443, 447 (1934).Accord, Mason v. Commonwealth, 357 S.W.2d 667 (Ky. 1962); Collins v. Com-
monwealth, 243 Ky. 438, 48 S.W.2d 1053 (1932).
"Turner v. Commonwealth, 328 S.W.2d 536,'538 (Ky. 1959); Accord, Bird-
song v. Commonwealth, 289 Ky. 521, 159 S.W.2d 41 (1942).45Cart v. Commonwealth, 307 Ky. 207, 210, 210 S.W.2d 778, 780 (1948).
Accord, Birdsong v. Commonwealth, 289 Ky. 521, 159 S.W.2d 41 (1942); Noah
v. Commonwealth, 273 Ky. 272, 116 S.W.2d 315 (1938).
19683
KYENTucKY LAw JouRNAL
Because of the reasonable doubt principle, it is not enough in
a criminal case that the jury find the existence of a proposition to
be more probable than its nonexistence. Consequently, in passing
upon the sufficiency of the evidence, the trial judge knows that
jurors, if the case is submitted to them, may be compelled "to find
that a fact does not exist even though persuaded by normal stan-
dards that the fact does exist.' 46 This difference in the degree of
jury persuasion influences the burden of going forward in criminal
cases by requiring a greater quantity of evidence to satisfy the
prosecution's initial responsibility. The minimum amount suf-
ficient to satisfy this responsibility is hypothetically represented on
the Prosecution's Scale of Figure 4 as 50 percent probability of
existence. Until this quantity of proof is produced, the prosecution
is subject to a response from the judge that no reasonable juror
could find the existence of the proposition in issue to the exclusion
of a reasonable doubt. (This response is hypothetically represented
on Figure 4 as the ranges of probability values falling between 0
and 50 percent on the Prosecution's Scale and 50 and 100 percent
on the Defendant's Scale and is designated as Response 1.) The
consequence of such a response is a directed verdict of acquittal.
Satisfaction of this responsibility by the prosecution serves to elicit
from the judge a response that reasonable jurors could find the
existence of the proposition in issue to the exclusion of a reason-
able doubt. (This response is hypothetically represented on Figure
4 as the ranges of probability values falling between 50 to 100 per-
cent on the Prosecution's Scale and 0 and 50 percent on the De-
fendant's Scale, and is designated as Response 2.) To understand
presumptions in criminal litigation, it is important to realize that
the prosecution, in satisfying this responsibility, can never intro-
duce enough proof to shift to the accused the burden of going for-
ward. Even though the evidence is so convincing that the trial
judge believes the existence of guilt to be 100 percent probable,
a verdict cannot be directed against the defendant.4 7 A plea of not
guilty serves to create for the accused a jury issue upon every fact
essential to his conviction. 48
46 MeNaughton. supra note 19, at 1889.
47 See, e.g., Mills v. Commonwealth, 195 Ky. 813, 243 S.W. 1022 (1922);
Wells v. Commonwealth, 195 Ky. 754, 243 S.W. 1032 (1922); Bardin v. Common-
wealth, 195 Ky. 652, 231 S.W. 208 (1921).
48 Commonwealth v. Gentry, 261 Ky. 564, 88 S.W.2d 273 (1935); Ball v.
Commonwealth, 81 Ky. 662 (1884).
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Once the prosecution has satisfied its initial responsibility of
producing enough evidence to elicit Response 2, the defendant may
undertake to introduce proof of the nonexistence of the facts
essential to conviction. In doing so, he may be able to offer suf-
ficient proof to again persuade the judge that no reasonable juror
could find the existence of these facts to the exclusion of a
reasonable doubt. The point at which this degree of mental "con-
vincement" is achieved is represented on the Defendant's Scale of
Figure 4 as 50 percent probability of nonexistence. Its achievement
serves to reimpose upon the prosecution the burden of going for-
ward with proof, which, if unsatisfied, will again entitle the accused
to a directed verdict. If, after all the proof by both sides has been
introduced, the judge believes that a reasonable jury could find
the existence of the facts in issue proved "beyond a reasonable
doubt," a jury issue has been created and the burden of going for-
ward has served its purpose.
IV. PRESUMPTIONS
A. General Presumption Doctrine in Kentucky
One of the principal causes for the confusion which exists in
the Kentucky law of presumptions has been the failure of the
Court of Appeals to define "presumptions" as rules of law and,
on that basis, to distinguish them from "inferences." Only on
rare occasions has the Court even hinted at the existence of such
a distinction:
Presumptive evidence is sometimes mistakenly confused
with circumstantial evidence but strict accuracy distinguishes
it therefrom. Presumptive evidence is the proof of one fact,
which, when shown, has a legitimate tendency to lead the
mind to the conclusion that another fact to be proven is in
existence. It may be the result of an arbitrary rule or legisla-
tive enactment .... Circumstantial evidence is the proof of
facts which have a legitimate tendency from the laws of
nature, the usual connection of things, and ordinary trans-
actions of business, etc., to show the reasonable mind that
the disputed fact was or was not in existence.49 (Emphasis
added).
40 Stark's Adm'x v. Herndon's Adm'r, 292 Ky. 469, 472, 166 S.W.2d 828,
830 (1942).
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With somewhat more precision and clarity, this distinction has
been expressed as follows:
If a court determines that B is a rational inference from A,
then the trier of fact is free to draw that inference as a matter
of general lay reasoning and persuasion without the aid of any
special procedural rules pertaining to litigation. Since there
are such special rules, since the word 'presumption' is often
used to refer to them, and since 'inference' is the word
generally used to refer to the process of drawing conclusions
of fact on the basis of general lay reasoning and experience,
it serves clarity and avoids confusion to observe this dis-
tinction between the two words.50
With this distinction in mind, a presumption should be defined
as a "rule of law which creates an artificial probative relation or
recognizes a naturally existing probative relation between two
specific facts, one of which is proved [hereinafter called basic fact]
and the other unproved [hereinafter called presumed fact]," 51 and
which attributes to that relationship a particular procedural
significance.52 The relationship of the proved to the unproved can
be described best by stating this well-known presumption: If a
person can be shown to have left his usual place of residence and
to have been absent without explanation for seven years (basic
facts), he is presumed to be deceased (presumed fact). The pro-
cedural significance of the relationship is more difficult to describe.
Referring to the diagram of Figure 1, once the basic facts have
been established, a presumption should always serve to achieve for
the party in whose favor it operates a response from the judge that
no reasonable juror could find the nonexistence of the presumed
fact (achievement of 70 percent probability, Plaintiff's Scale,
50 James, supra note 29, at 64.
51 Geraldson, Effect of Presumptions, 26 Mn(Q. L. REV. 115, 116 (1942).
Accord, 9 WiGMORE § 2491; Morgan, Some Observations Concerning Presump-
tions, 44 HAnv. L. REv. 906 (1931); Stumbo, Presumptions-A View at Chaos, 3
WAsHBURN L.J. 182 (1964).5 2 This definition, and the discussion which follows, does not include those
rules of law known as "conclusive presumptions." It is conceded by all that such
rules play no part in a discussion of the law of presumptions. As stated by
Wigmore: "Whenever from one fact another is said to be conclusively presumed,
in the sense that the opponent is absolutely orecluded from showing any evidence
that the second fact does not exist, the rule is really providing that where the
first fact is shown to exist, the second fact's existence is wholly immaterial for the
purpose of the proponent's case; and to provide this is to make a rule of sub-
stantive law, and not a rule apportioning the burden of persuading as to certain
propositions or varying the duty of coming forward with evidence. 9 WiGMorx
§ 2492.
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Figure 1).53 Given this significance, the presumption does two
things for its proponent. It satisfies his initial burden of going for-
ward with evidence, and at the same time shifts that burden over
to the opponent of the presumption. 4 Unless these two conse-
quences follow proof of the basic facts, as stated by Wigmore,
"there is no propriety in applying the term 'presumption' to such
facts, however great their probative significance." 55 Except in those
instances where the Court of Appeals has failed to distinguish pre-
sumptions and inferences, Kentucky cases have accorded pre-
sumptions these two procedural consequences.
The difficulty in applying a presumption arises after it has been
accorded the above consequences and its opponent has introduced
sufficient evidence to elicit from the judge a response that reason-
able jurors could differ as to the existence or nonexistence of the
presumed fact (achievement of 30 percent probability, Defendant's
scale, Figure 1). Of course, such evidence serves to satisfy the
responsibility which was shifted to the opponent by the presump-
tion. And, as stated before, with this response (designated on Fig-
ure 1 as Response 2), the burden of going forward with evidence
vanishes and the risk of non-persuasion comes into focus. Also
coming into focus are questions related to the continuing effect of
the presumption: Being a rule of law, does it simply disappear
into the "sun-shine of actual facts,"56 or does it have an effect
upon the placement of the risk of non-persuasion? Does it serve to
impose upon the party against whom it operates the burden of
establishing to the satisfaction of the jury the nonexistence of the
presumed fact? To what extent, if any, will the jurors be permitted
to use the presumption in making their decision, and how are they
to be instructed as to its appropriate use? All of these questions
are vital to a proper application of presumptions. Yet, efforts to
5 The discussion in this section, as well as those which follow, assumes that
the basic facts of the presumptions under consideration are not contested. This
assumption is made to avoid discussion of matters which have been adequately
discussed in many of the articles cited in this writing. It is necessary, however,
to emphasize that an opponent of a presumption has two distinct avenues of
attack against the operation of that presumption. He may contest the existence
of the basic facts or he may concede their existence and contest the existence of
the presumed fact. It is the latter situation which has created the difficult prob-
lems. A5 4 See 9 WIGMOpx § 249; Morgan, supra note 51; Surbin, Presumptions and
Their Treatment Under the Law of Ohio, 26 Omo ST. L.J. 175 (1965).
55 WiGMORE § 2491.56 Mockowik v. Kansas City, St J. & C.B.R.R., 196 Mo. 550, 571, 94 S.W.
256, 262 (1906).
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answer them have been virtually chaotic, with little uniformity
among or within jurisdictions.
The simplest and most widely accepted answers have been
provided by Professors Thayer"r and Wigmore5 8 Under the ap-
proach developed by these two scholars, once the opponent of a
presumption introduces enough proof to convince the trial judge
that a reasonable juror could find that the presumed fact does not
exist (Response 2, Figure 1), "the presumption disappears as a rule
of law, and the case is [left] in the jury's hands free from any
rule."59 The risk of non-persuasion is unaffected by the operation
of the presumption and no mention of the relationship between
the basic facts and the presumed fact is made to the jury. Two
reasons are presented in support of this view. One, previously
mentioned, is that the risk of non-persuasion is fixed at the
beginning of a trial and can never shift from its original alloca-
tion. The other is a belief, originating with Thayer and Wig-more,
that all presumptions "[are] based, in policy, upon the probative
strength, as a matter of reasoning and inference, of the [basic]
facts,"60 and that these basic facts should never be endowed with
any artificial, judicially-imposed probative force. To permit a pre-
sumption to affect persuasion of the jury in any manner is thought
to endow it with such force.
This approach has been questioned on two grounds. The first
concerns its thesis that the risk of non-persuasion, once allocated,
can never shift:
Surely there is no inherent reason why the original alloca-
tion should not be reconsidered when the case finally goes to
the jury, on all the factors which are seen to be relevant at
that time. Moreover ... there is no need to make any alloca-
tion of the persuasion burden at the beginning of the trial or
at any other time unless and until the production burden on
every dispositive issue is out of the case and the issues are
submitted to the jury, so that all talk of shifting the persuasion
is beside the point. And surely the considerations relevant at
the time of final submission should determine how the per-
suasion burden is to be placed, and not those which appeared
57 P. THAY n, A PRELnmmsuny TEATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON LAW
313-52 (1898).5 8 See 9 WicMoHm §§ 2490-93.
59 Id. at § 2491.
60 Id.
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to be relevant at an earlier time if they are different.61 (Em-
phasis added).
The second concerns the Thayer-Wigmore belief that all pre-
sumptions owe their existence solely to a rational probative con-
nection between the basic facts and the presumed fact. The chief
opponent of this belief was Professor Morgan who asserted that all
presumptions cannot be made to accommodate the same pro-
cedural function because their creation and existence are justified
by different reasons.62 For example, some presumptions, such as
the one which presumes death after an unexplained absence of
seven years, have no reason for their existence other than "a purely
procedural convenience" to enable courts to resolve disputes which
would otherwise be insoluble.63 Others, such as the presumption
that a letter properly addressed and mailed is received in due
course by the addressee, owe their existence to the probative
strength of the basic facts. A presumption of either of these types,
according to Morgan, satisfies its purpose simply by shifting the
burden of going forward with evidence to the party against whom
it operates.6 4 If and when this shifted burden is discharged the pre-
sumption disappears from the case, just as under the Thayer-
Wigmore approach. Other presumptions, however, have a more
substantial reason for their existence and merit a more sub-
stantial procedural function. Illustrative of such presumptions is
the one which presumes that if commercial goods have been
transported by several carriers and delivered to the addressee in a
damaged condition, the carrier last having possession caused the
damage. This presumption has its origin "in considerations of the
comparative convenience with which the parties can produce
evidence of the fact in issue."65 And since one of the principal
factors used to allocate the risk of non-persuasion is the relative
access of the parties to knowledge about the disputed fact, to ac-
cord this presumption no more effect than to shift the burden of
going forward with evidence is to ignore in great part the reason
61 James, supra note 29, at 62-63.62 See Morgan, supra note 51; Morgan, Further Observations on Presump-
tions, 16 S. CAL. L. PEv. 245 (1943); Morgan, How to Approach Burden of
Proof and Presumptions, 25 Rocny MT. L. REv. 34 (1952); Morgan, Instructing
the Jury Upon Presumptions and Burden of Proof, 47 HAnv. L. RE v. 59 (1933).
63 See Morgan, supra note 51.
64 Id.
65 Id. at 926.
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for its existence. Thus, Morgan asserted that presumptions of this
kind, in addition to shifting the burden of going forward, should
compel the opponent to persuade the jury of the nonexistence of
the presumed fact, i.e., bear the risk of non-persuasion.
The effect given a presumption in Kentucky, after evidence to
rebut it has been introduced, is not without considerable un-
certainty. The Court of Appeals appears, although not expressly,
to have adopted the reasoning of Thayer and Wigmore, that pre-
sumptions are based in policy solely upon the natural probative
strength of their basic facts. As stated in the case of Lee v.
Tucker,6 6 if evidence is to be "accorded the dignity of a pre-
sumption it should not be because a wooden rule puts it in that
category, but only because it is that persuasive."6 7 The Court also
purports to agree with the view of these two scholars concerning
allocation of the risk of non-persuasion:
As to the shifting of the burden of proof, the first burden
mentioned above, the risk of non-persuasion never shifts. The
burden of proof is on the party who would be defeated if no
evidence were offered on either side and is fixed at the begin-
ning of the trial by the nature of the allegations of the plead-
ings, and does not change during the course of the trial....
The second kind of burden, however, the duty of going for-
ward with evidence, does have this characteristic of shifting6 8
With this reason for the existence of presumptions and this con-
struction of the burden of proof concept, the Kentucky Court has
always asserted that a presumption can serve only to shift to its
opponent the burden of going forward with evidence.6 9 When this
burden is satisfied, "the presumption disappears, and the issues
must be decided on the evidence." 70 Stated more succinctly, a
presumption "one moment stands with sufficient force to de-
termine an issue, but at the next, by reason of the slightest re-
66365 S.W.2d 849 (Ky. 1963).
671d. at 851.68 Galloway Motor Co. v. Huffman's Adm'r, 281 Ky. 841, 851, 137 S.W.2d
379, 384 (1940). Accord, Moss v. Mittel, 253 Ky. 504, 69 S.W.2d 1046 (1934).69 See, e.g., Houser v. Coursey, 310 Ky. 625, 221 S.W.2d 432 (1949);
Cincinnati, N.O. & T.P.Ry. v. Nelson, 299 Ky. 19, 184 S.W.2d 108 (1944);
Dunning v. Kentucky Util. Co., 270 Ky. 44, 109 S.W.2d 6 (1937); see also, Hall
v. E. I. Dupont De Nemours & Co., 142 F. Supp. 737 (E.D. Ky. 1956).70oCarroll 'v. "Carroll, 251 S.W.2,d 989, 991 (Ky. 1952). Accord, Dudley's
Adm'r v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 240 S.W.2d 76 (Ky. 1951); Poindexter's Adm'r
v. Alexander, 277 Ky. 147, 125 S.W.2d 981 (1939).
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butting evidence, topples utterly out of consideration for the trier
of facts."71
Despite frequent and unequivocal assertions such as these, on
several occasions the Kentucky Court has attributed to presump-
tions a more significant procedural consequence. An example is
the case of Utilities Appliance Co. v. Toon's Adm'r 1 2 In this case,
the plaintiff's intestate, while crossing a street, had been killed by
a vehicle driven by the defendant's employee. The death occurred
in a residential area, and proof that the defendant's vehicle was
traveling in excess of twenty miles per hour at the time of the
accident was presented. To establish negligence, the plaintiff re-
lied upon a statute which created a presumption of unreasonable
and improper driving upon proof of a rate of speed in a resi-
dential district of more than twenty miles per hour. This pre-
sumption was accorded its usual functions. It satisfied the plaintiff's
initial responsibility of going forward with evidence on the
negligence issue, and then shifted that responsibility to the de-
fendant. By introducing proof that, in spite of the excessive speed,
his vehicle was operated reasonably and properly under the cir-
cumstances, the defendant satisfied his burden. Under the Thayer-
Wigmore view, at this point in the proceedings the purpose of the
presumption should have been spent, and the issue of negligence
submitted to the jury without mentioning the presumption and
with the risk of non-persuasion allocated to the plaintiff. This was
not the procedural consequence ordered by the Court of Appeals.
After stating that this presumption served to shift the burden of
proof, the Court clearly indicated that it intended by this the risk
of non-persuasion, for it ordered that the following instruction be
given on retrial:
If you believe from the evidence that the defendant's vehicle
was traveling in excess of twenty miles per hour at the time
of the accident, you must find for the plaintiff, unless you
further believe that the speed of the vehicle, although in ex-
cess of twenty miles per hour, was not unreasonable or im-
proper under the circumstances.7
As indicated earlier, an instruction such as this serves under Ken-
7l Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. Tuggle's Adm'r, 254 Ky. 814, 819, 72
S.W.2d 440, 443 (1934).
72241 Ky. 823, 45 S.W.2d 478 (1932).
73 241 Ky. at 824, 45 S.W.2d at 479.
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tucky law to impose upon the defendant the risk of non-persuasion
as to the presumed fact.
The Toon's case is not the only case in which the Court of Ap-
peals has used a presumption to shift the risk of non-persuasion. In
the case of Schechter v. Hann74 such treatment was accorded the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. Involved in Schechter was an injury
which the plaintiff had received when struck by the defendant's
car. To establish negligence, the plaintiff proved facts necessary to
invoke the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.76 Defendant countered
with proof that a spring on his vehicle broke and caused him to
lose control of the vehicle without negligence on his part. In
reference to the procedural function of res ipsa loquitur, the Court
of Appeals said that "a presumption of negligence arises and the
burden of proof is on the defendant to rebut the presumption." 76
This time the Court in two ways indicated that burden of proof, as
used in its statement, was meant to include not only the burden of
going forward but also the risk of non-persuasion. First the Court
approved an instruction submitting the negligence issue to the
jury in these words:
You will find for the plaintiff, unless you believe from the
evidence that the spring on the defendant's car broke and
caused him to lose control of his car.77
Secondly the Court stated:
Unless he, [the defendant], was able to establish to the
jury's satisfaction that there was such an intervening agency
[breaking of the spring], the presumption of negligence
remained and controlled.78 (Emphasis added).
In spite of cases such as Toon's and Schechter, the Court of Ap-
peals continues to assert that the risk of non-persuasion can never
shift.
Before undertaking a discussion of the treatment accorded the
more important particular presumptions under Kentucky law,
the problem of instructing jurors as to the existence of presump-
tions should be mentioned. On this point the Thayer-Wigmore
74305 Ky. 794, 205 S.W.2d 690 (1947).
75 ssubsequent discussion will reveal, Kentucky, with great difficulty and
confusion, has attempted to treat this doctrine as a presumption.
768305 Ky. at 797, 205 S.W.2d at 692.
77 Id.
78 Id. at 798, 205 S.W.2d at 693.
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view and the Morgan view are in agreement that jurors are not
generally capable of accurately and intelligently applying pre-
sumptions.79 Thus, under neither of these views are presumptions
submitted to jurors for consideration in the decision-making pro-
cess. If the presumption is one which merely shifts the burden of
going forward with evidence, satisfaction of that burden serves to
dissolve the presumption. If it is of such a nature that, under the
Morgan view, it functions to transfer the risk of non-persuasion,
then the jurors are instructed in such a way that the burden of
persuading them as to the nonexistence of the presumed fact is on
the party against whom the presumption operates. In either situa-
tion, the presumption lives and dies "without the knowledge of
the jury, and without affecting the judge's charge in any way."80
Purporting to agree with this viewpoint, the Kentucky Court
has said that "it is never proper to instruct the jury as to pre-
sumptions of law or of fact." 81 Rather than expressing doubt that
jurors can properly use presumptions in their deliberations, the
reason given by the Court for this ruling is that such instructions
would offend "the rule against the court commenting on the
evidence and indicating to the jury what weight should be given
it."82 But once again inconsistency exists between what the Court
79 See 9 WIGmoRE H§ 249-93; Morgan, Presumptions, 12 WASH. L. REv. 254(1937). A third view of the -procedural consequences to be attributed to pre-
sumptions should be mentioned at this point because of the manner in which it
treats jury instructions on presumptions. It has developed under the guidance of
Professor McCormick, and in most respects does not differ from that of Morgan.
Recognizing that all presumptions do not owe their existence to the probative
strength of the basic facts, McCormick conceived that under some circumstances
a presumption should operate to shift to the opponent not only the burden of
going forward with the evidence but also the risk of non-persuasion. But when
a case involving a presumption is submitted to a jury, the existence of the
presumption, according to McCormick, should be mentioned to the jurors so that
they "may appreciate the legal recognition of a slant of policy or probability as
the reason for placin " on the opponent of the presumption the risk of non-
persuasion. McCormick, What Shall The Trial Judge Tell The jury About
Presumptions?, 13 WAsH. L. Ruv. 185 (1938). In adopting this viewpoint,
McCormick himself acknowledged the great difficulty which jurors would have with
presumptions: "The baffling nature of the presumption as a tool for the art of
hinling bewilders one who searches for a form of phrasing with which to
present the notion to a jury." C. McCouvrcm, LAw OF EVIDENCE 669 (1954).80 Morgan, Instructing the Jur Upon Presumptions and Burden of Proof,
47 HAuv. L. REv. 59, 75 (1933).81Pacific Mut. Life v. Meade, 281 Ky. 36, 40, 134 S.W.2d 960, 965 (1939).
Accord, Utilities Appliance Co. v. Toon's Adm'r, 241 Ky. 823, 45 S.W.2d 478(1932); Gorman v. Berry, 289 Ky. 88, 158 S.W.2d 155 (1942); Ferguson v.
Billups, 244 Ky. 85, 50 S.W.2d 35 (1932); Mussellam v. Cincinnati, N.O.&T.P.Ry.,
126 Ky. 500, 104 S.W. 337 (1907); Henning v. Stevenson, 118 Ky. 318, 80 S.W.
1135 (1904).
82Pacific Mut. Life v. Meade, 281 Ky. 36, 40, 134 S.W.2d 960, 965 (1939).
Accord, Tines v. Commonwealth, 25 Ky. L. fptr. 1233, 77 S.W. 363 (1903).
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of Appeals has said and what it has done. In several instances, in-
structions to juries as to the existence of presumptions have been
given and approved . 3 The more important of these will be dis-
cussed in the following sections.
B. The Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur
Probably the only aspect of this doctrine about which there is
no confusion in the Kentucky cases concerns the requirements
necessary to invoke its operation. Only where an accident has re-
sulted from the use of an instrumentality and where the following
facts are established may res ipsa loquitur be applied:
(1) The defendant must have had full management of the
instrumentality which caused the injury; (2) the circum-
stances must be such that, according to common knowledge
and the experience of mankind, the accident could not have
happened if those having control and management had not
been negligent; (8) the plaintiff's injury must have resulted
from the accident.8 4
The Court of Appeals has stated, although somewhat incon-
sistently, that upon proof of these basic facts a "rebuttable pre-
sumption [of the defendant's negligence] is raised by the plain-
tiff and the burden of overcoming that presumption shifts to the
defendant."8' 5 What this actually means in terms of procedural
effect has been the subject of continuing controversy.
The effect attributed to the doctrine by most of the early
decisions is represented by the case of Quillen v. Skaggs:86
The application of this doctrine makes a prima facie case
for the plaintiff, so far as negligence is concerned by merely
shifting to the defendant the burden of producing evidence on
the subject. It merely raises a legal presumption in the plain-
tiffs favor that [his injuries resulted from the defendant's
negligence] .... This is, of course, a rebuttable presumption,
and means no more than that plaintiff is entitled to a favorable
83 See, e.g., Murrell v. Commonwealth, 291 Ky. 65, 163 S.W.2d 1 (1942);
Cannon v. Commonwealth, 243 Ky. 302, 47 S.W.2d 1075 (1932); Charles v.
Commonwealth, 222 Ky. 99, 300 S.W. 357 (1927); Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co.
v. Martin, 108 Ky. 11, 55 S.W. 694 (1900); Adwell v. Commonwealth, 56 Ky.
310 (1856).84 Vemon's Adm'r v. Gentry, 834 S.W.2d 266, 268 (Ky. 1960). Accord, e.g.,
J.C. Penny Co. v. Livingston, 271 S.W.2d 906 (Ky. 1954).
85 Vernon's Adm'r v. Gentry, 334 S.W.2d 266, 268 (Ky. 1960).86233 Ky. 171, 25 S.W.2d 33 (1930).
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finding, unless the defendant introduces evidence to over-
come it.87
Under this ruling, if the defendant attempted to satisfy his burden
and introduced facts and circumstances into the scale against the
"basic facts," the trial judge had to measure the sufficiency of
all the evidence to determine if a jury issue had been created. If
he decided that no reasonable juror could find the existence of
negligence, the burden of going forward shifted back to the plain-
tiff, and required that he introduce more proof, or have his case
dismissed. 8 (The Court has stated on several occasions that a
decision like this would be appropriate only if the evidence was of
"a conclusive character, undisputed and uncontradicted or show-
[ed] physical circumstances which reduce [d] the situation almost
to a certitude.")89 If the judge decided that reasonable jurors could
differ as to the existence or nonexistence of negligence, the pre-
sumption of negligence vanished and the case was submitted to
the jury free of the res ipsa loquitur principle. This was consistent
with the Thayer-Wigmore general approach to the procedural
operation of presumptions.
In later cases, the Court of Appeals expanded the procedural
importance of this rule. The case which most clearly sets forth
this expansion is Lewis v. Wolk:90
[T]he doctrine of res ipse loquitur is a rule . . . which
compels the court to take judicial notice that the defendant
has been negligent, that the plaintiff has established a com-
plete case in his own favor, that the defendant must prove af-
firmatively, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the
defendant was not negligent, and that the jury has just one
duty to perform, i.e., to find whether or not the defendant has
proved that he was not negligent.91 (Emphasis added).
As construed by the Court in this case, the doctrine possessed all of
the procedural consequences assigned by the Quillen case. It
satisfied the plaintiff's initial responsibility of going forward with
87 Id. at 176, 25 S.W.2d at 35.88 See Houser v. Coursey, 310 Ky. 625, 221 S.W.2d 432 (1949); Cincin-
nati, N.O.& T.P.Ry. v. Nelson, 299 Ky. 19, 184 S.W.2d 108 (1944); Black Moun-
tain Corp. v. Partin's Adm'r, 234 Ky. 791, 49 S.W.2d 1014 (1932).89 Crawford v. Alexander, 259 S.W.2d 476, 478 (Ky. 1953). Accord, Dun-
ning v. Kentucky Util. Co., 270 Ky. 44, 109 S.W.2d 6 (1937); Black Mountain
Corp. v. Partin's Adm'r, 234 Ky. 791, 49 S.W.2d 1014 (1932).
90 312 Ky. 536, 228 S.W.2d 432 (1950).91 Id. at 539, 228 S.W.2d at 434.
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proof on the negligence issue, and at the same time served to shift
that responsibility to the defendant. However, it was given one ad-
ditional function: If the defendant satisfied his burden of pro-
ducing evidence, but did not introduce enough for a directed
verdict against the plaintiff, the issue of negligence had to be sub-
mitted to the jury with the defendant bearing the risk of non-
persuasion. Consistent with its previous ruling in Schechter v.
Hann,12 supra, the Court held that this served to shift the risk of
non-persuasion from plaintiff to defendant.
Some indication that the Court of Appeals may never have
intended the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to perform the function
accorded it in Schechter is found in subsequent decisions, one of
which is Kentucky Home Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Wise.93 In this
case, the Court acknowledged that res ipsa loquitur could be given
either of the constructions described in the preceding paragraph.
It could serve to impose upon the defendant only the burden of
going forward with evidence on the negligence issue; or it could
serve to shift "the burden of proof entirely over on the defendant
to rebut negligence by evidence of greater weight."94 The Court
further acknowledged that the doctrine could be given a third
procedural effect, i.e., "as a permissive inference which would re-
quire no directed verdict for the plaintiff in case the defendant
failed to offer any evidence in defense." 95 Under this last con-
struction, proof of the basic facts would serve only to satisfy the
plaintiff's initial responsibility of going forward with evidence
(achievement of 30 percent probability on Plaintiff's Scale, Figure
1). Discussion of the doctrine was completed with this statement:
When we get right down to practicalities, the procedural
theory followed by courts in a given case depends largely on
'the strength of the inference to be drawn, which will vary
with the circumstances of the case.' 96
Since its decision in Wise, the Court of Appeals has made two
further pronouncements which affect the procedural treatment of
res ipsa loquitur. With particular application to this "pre-
92305 Ky. 794, 205 S.W.2d 690 (1947).
93364 S.W.2d 388 (Ky. 1961).
94Id. at 340.
95 Id.
96 Id.
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sumption," the Court has reasserted its position that the risk of
non-persuasion can never shift.9 7 This limits the procedural con-
sequence of the doctrine to either a permissive inference, as de-
scribed immediately above, or a presumption which does no more
than shift to the defendant the burden of going forward with
proof. Secondly, the Court has asserted that whether the doctrine
rises to the dignity of this kind of presumption depends in each
case upon the natural persuasive force of the "basic facts."98 Con-
strued in this manner, the doctrine no more than recognizes "that
as a matter of common knowledge and experience the very nature
of an occurrence may justify an inference of negligence on the part
of the person who controls the instrumentality causing the in-
jury."99 And in each case in which it is invoked, the trial judge
must gauge the probative force of the basic facts to determine
whether or not they are strong enough to "authorize a finding for
the plaintiff," or "to require a finding for the plaintiff" if the de-
fendant introduces no proof.100
Given this interpretation, no benefit is derived from calling
res ipsa loquitur a presumption. The task which it requires the
trial judge to perform is no different from the task which he per-
forms in every case in deciding whether to submit factual issues to
a jury for decision. The concept which requires that he do this was
described previously as the "burden of going forward with the
evidence." Unless the basic facts of the doctrine are construed to re-
quire the trial judge to award the plaintiff a directed verdict,
absent rebuttal cvidence by the defendant, it should be labeled as
a "permissive inference," if the need for a label exists. Whether
the doctrine merits the consequence of a directed verdict should
depend upon the reason conceived for its existence by the Court
of Appeals. If, as some authorities say, the reason is simply that
an inference of negligence may be drawn from the "basic facts,"' 01
then it should be treated just as the Kentucky Court presently
treats it. However, if the reason for its existence is that evidence
97See Lee's Adm'r v. Tucker's Adm'r, 865 S.W.2d 849 (Ky. 1968).
98See Mix's Ex'r v. Smith, 887 S.W.2d 1 (Ky. 1965); Bell & Koch, Inc. v.
Stanley, 875 S.W.2d 696 (Ky. 1984); Lee's Adm'r v. Tucker's Adm'r, 865
S.W.2d 849 (Ky. 1963).
99 875 S.W.2d at 697.
100 See Mix's Ex'r v. Smith, 887 S.W.2d 1 (Ky. 1965).
101 See, e.g., W. PnossER, L~w oF To RTs 199-211 (2d ed. 1955).
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which will explain the accident is more accessible to the defendant
than to the plaintiff, as asserted by other authorities,102 it merits a
greater procedural consequence. Doubt as to the soundness of this
latter assertion has relegated the doctrine in most jurisdictions to
the procedural significance given it in Kentucky, which is short
of that attributed to a "rebuttable presumption."
C. Presumption of Guilt From Possession of Stolen Property
The source of the presumption discussed in this section is
Kentucky Revised Statutes [hereinafter referred to as KRS] §
483.290. After creating the criminal offense of knowingly receiving
stolen property, this statute provides that "possession by any person
of any stolen property shall be prima facie evidence of his guilt
under this section." Since the term "prima facie evidence" has been
construed in Kentucky to be synonymous with the term "pre-
sumption,"103 the Court of Appeals has always ruled that pos-
session of stolen property constitutes either "presumptive evidence
of guilt"'1 4 or a "rebuttable presumption of guilt."'' 05 In at-
tempting to treat this statute as a presumption, the Court has ap-
plied it not only to the offense of receiving stolen property but
also to the related offense of larceny.
To invoke this presumption, the prosecution must establish
two basic facts: (1) That the property in question was stolen; and
(2) that at the time of the accused's apprehension it was in his
possession. 06 Once these facts are established, the accused is pre-
sumed guilty of the offense charged, the effect of which is generally
stated in these terms:
[T] he possession of stolen property shifts the burden to
the person who has possession of same to make a satisfactory
explanation of the circumstances and facts under which the
property came into his possession. Stated differently, posses-
102 See, e.g., Wilson v. East St. Louis & Interurban Water Co., 295 IMI. App.
603, 15 N.E.2d 599 (1938); Lynch v. Ninemire Packing Co., 63 Wash. 423, 115
P. 838 (1911); 9 WiGMoRE § 2509.
103 See, e.g., Dudley's Adm'r v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 240 S.W.2d 76 (Ky.
1951); Gorman v. Berry, 289 Ky. 88, 158 S.W.2d 155 (1942); Utilities Ap-
pliance Co. v. Toon's Adm'r 241 Ky. 823, 45 S.W.2d 478 (1932); Mussellam
v. Cincinnati, N.O.& T.P.Ry., 126 Ky. 500, 104 S.W. 337 (1907).
104 Davis v. Commonwealth, 191 Ky. 242, 244, 229 S.W. 1029, 1030 (1921).
105 Clatos v. Commonwealth, 299 Ky. 851, 853, 184 S.W.2d 125, 126 (1945).
106E.g., Clark v. Commonwealth, 288 Ky. 845, 157 S.W.2d 485 (1941);
Conley v. Commonwealth, 230 Ky. 391, 20 S.W.2d 75 (1929).
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sion of stolen property creates only a rebuttable presumption
of guilt rather than a conclusive one.1
0 7
Reference to Figure 4, and the discussion which follows that
diagram, will show that the burden shifted to the defendant by
this presumption could not possibly be that of going forward with
evidence. In all cases, the consequence of not satisfying this re-
sponsibility is a directed verdict, and since a verdict can never be
directed against an accused who has entered a plea of not guilty,
the burden to produce evidence can never be shifted to a criminal
defendant. This would seem to leave only the risk of non-per-
suasion to be affected by the presumption of guilt from pos-
session of stolen property. On occasion, the Court of Appeals has
used language indicating that this is the "burden" referred to in
the above statement:
The rule is that possession of stolen property shortly
after the theft is ... presumptive evidence of guilt casting
upon the accused the burden of showing his innocence by
explaining his possession to the satisfaction of the jury....13s
(Emphasis added).
Despite this language, in no case has the Court used this pre-
sumption to actually shift to an accused the burden of persuading a
jury of his innocence. What then are the procedural consequences
of the presumption of guilt?
This question was answered in Tibbs v. Commonwealth.0 9 In
that case, the Court of Appeals reviewed past decisions involving
this presumption and discovered that in virtually all of them the
issue presented on appeal was the sufficiency of evidence to sustain
a guilty verdict. The Court then made the following statement:
The opinions, . . . followed a long settled rule in cri-
minal practice to the effect that possession by the accused of
stolen property is not only sufficient to submit the issue of his
guilt to the jury under a charge of larceny, but likewise suf-
ficient to sustain a verdict of guilty by the jury .... "9 (Em-
phasis added).
Stated somewhat differently, proof that an accused possessed stolen
107 Rogers v. Commonwealth, 289 Ky. 83, 86, 158 S.W.2d 144, 146 (1942).
108 Jacobs v. Commonwealth, 260 Ky. 142, 144, 84, S.W.2d 1, 2 (1935).
Accord, Harem v. Commonwealth, 270 Ky. 574, 110 S.W.2d 305 (1937).
109 273 Ky. 356, 116 S.W.2d 667 (1938).
110 Id. at 359, 116 S.W.2d at 669.
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property is sufficient only to satisfy the prosecution's initial burden
of going forward with evidence (achievement of 50 percent
probability, Prosecution's Scale, Figure 4). This construction of the
presumption of guilt is consistent with the reason for its existence,
which is simply the natural probative connection existing between
the "basic facts" and the "presumed fact," as a matter of lay
reasoning. On the basis of logic and experience, it is natural to
infer that a person possessing stolen property either stole the pro-
perty or acquired it knowing that it was stolen. Since this inference
will still exist even if the defendant introduces rebuttal evidence,
and may be weighed by the jury, it should neither be permitted
to affect the risk of non-persuasion nor be referred to as a pre-
sumption. It performs its intended function not because it is a
rule of law but because of the persuasive power of the basic facts.
If it must be labeled, then like the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur,
it should be called a "permissive inference."
D. Presumption of Master-Servant Relationship
In terms of frequency of use, one of the most important pre-
sumptions is that which presumes a defendant's employee to have
been acting within the scope of his employment at the time of a
vehicle accident. Two basic facts must be established to bring this
presumption into operation: (1) The vehicle in question must
have been owned by the defendant at the time of the accident; and
(2) the driver of that vehicle must have been a regular employee
of the defendant. 1 Proof of these facts creates for the plain-
tiff "a prima facie case that at the time of the accident . .. [the
defendant's] agent was acting within the scope of his employ-
ment." 112 Presenting a prima facie case satisfies the plaintiffs
initial responsibility of introducing proof of this proposition and
at the same time shifts that responsibility to the defendant.1 3 As
to this procedural consequence, there is no dispute in any Ken-
tucky case. If the defendant introduces no proof rebutting the
presumed fact, the plaintiff is entitled to a peremptory instruction.
"'I E.g., Dennes v. Jefferson Meat Mkt., Inc., 228 Ky. 164, 14 S.W.2d 408
(1929); Wood v. Indianapolis Abattoir Co., 178 Ky. 188, 198 S.W. 732 (1917).
112 Galloway Motor Co. v. Huffman's Adm'r, 281 Ky. 841, 845, 137 S.W.2d
379, 881 1940).113 1J.
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If such proof is introduced, again the continued procedural opera-
tion of the presumption is uncertain.
Most of this uncertainty has been created by a series of cases in
which the Court of Appeals has attempted to describe the kind of
evidence sufficient to completely overcome this presumption,
thereby entitling its opponent to a decision as a matter of law.
Evidence sufficient to merit this consequence has been charac-
terized in this way:
[S]uch presumption is overcome when it is met by uncon-
tradicted and unimpeached evidence which disproves the pre-
sumption and which evidence is in harmony with the facts
upon which the presumption is based.1 14 (Emphasis added).
That which does not overcome the presumption has been described
as evidence "of a contradictory and somewhat suspicious nature
and [which] does not leave the mind impressed to any high degree
with its truth."11 5 As a result of these principles, virtually every
case involving this presumption has developed into an attempt by
the Court of Appeals to describe evidence rebutting the presumed
fact as either "conclusive and unimpeached," or "contradictory and
suspicious." The result has been wasted effort and needless con-
fusion. Absolutely no benefit can be derived from developing a
standard of measurement for determining when this presumption
has been overcome which is different from the one used to make
virtually the same determination in non-presumption cases. In
deciding whether any presumption has been successfully rebutted,
courts can decide only that either the probability of existence of
the presumed fact is such that no reasonable juror could find its
existence, that reasonable jurors could differ, or that no reason-
able juror could find its nonexistence. This task is not facilitated
by standards couched in unintelligible language.
Once the decision has been made that the presumption of
agency has not been overcome, i.e., reasonable jurors could differ
as to the existence or nonexistence of the presumed fact, there
remains the question of what effect it should have upon the risk
114 Livingston v. Fields, 311 Ky. 714, 716, 225 S.W.2d 317, 318-19 (1949).
Accord, Rawlings v. Clay Motor Co., 287 Ky. 604, 154 S.W.2d 711 (1941);
Ashland Coca Cola Bottling Co. v. Ellison, 252 Ky. 172, 66 S.W.2d 52 (1934).
115 Home Laundry Co. v. Cook, 277 Ky. 8, 13, 125 S.W.2d 763, 766 (1939).
Accord, Dixie-Ohio Express Co. v. Webb, 299 Ky. 201 184 S.W.2d 61 (1944);
Sharp v. Faulkner, 292 Ky. 179, 166 S.W.2d 62 (1942).
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of non-persuasion. The Court of Appeals has decided this question
in the following manner:
The burden of establishing agency is on the one asserting
its existence.... It does not shift. After appellants made out a
prima facie case [by use of the presumption], the duty of
going forward with the evidence rested on appellees. When
they presented evidence on this question, an issue of fact was
created, but the ultimate burden of establishing this fact to the
satisfaction of the jury always remained on appellants. 1 6
(Empasis added).
This construction is consistent with the Court's assertion that the
risk of non-persuasion can never shift. But it is not consistent with
the reason given for the existence of the presumption of master-
servant relationship:
Because it is often impossible for the plaintiff to prove
the agency of the operator, it is deemed desirable socially that
the burden of introducing evidence on non-agency should be
placed upon the defendant in whose peculiar knowledge rests
the material evidence essential to a determination of this
fact."17
In the interest of a fair determination of this issue, which is prob-
ably the most important factor in allocating the risk of non-
persuasion,"" it would seem desirable, in situations where this
presumption is applicable, to award the plaintiff whatever ad-
vantage would accompany an imposition of this risk on the de-
fendant.
E. Presumption of Death From Seven Years Absence
A presumption of death arises upon proof of the following
basic facts: (1) That the person whose death is in issue has been
absent from his usual place of residence for seven consecutive
years; (2) that he has not been heard from by those who, if he
were alive, would naturally have information about him; and
116 Bogner v. Kendle, 809 Ky. 221, 223-24, 217 S.W.2d 211-12 (1949).
17 Union Transfer & Storage Co. v. Fryman's Adm'r, 804 Ky. 422, 426, 200
S.W.2d 953, 954-55 (1947).
118 See James, Burdens of Proof, 47 VA. L. R!iv. 51 (1961).
[Vol. 57,
THE LAW OF PREsumPONS
(3) that his absence has been unexplained.119 Once these facts
are proved, "the burden of proof is shifted to the person attacking
the presumption to prove that the person claimed to be dead is
still alive."' 20 The "burden" referred to in this statement is only
that of going forward with the evidence.121 Since this presumption
has been "adopted as a convenient and necessary substitution for
proof in order to avoid deadlock in business affairs,"2 it should
not affect the risk of non-persuasion. Once the deadlock is broken
by actual proof rebutting the presumed fact, the presumption has
accomplished its purpose and should disappear from consideration,
the jury deciding the issue on the basis of that proof.
Two problems have arisen in the application of this principle.
The first is similar to a problem discussed in connection with the
presumption of master-servant relationship. Under what circum-
stances is a party against whom the presumption of death operates
entitled to a peremptory instruction? In attempting to answer this
question, the Court of Appeals has again created a distinction be-
tween what it calls "positive, direct, and unimpeached 'lm evidence
(which overcomes the presumption) and "rumor and unauthenti-
cated' 24 evidence (which does not overcome the presumption).
These standards of measurement are like all of the others which
have been used to pass upon the sufficiency of proof. They do not
convey to anyone the degree of belief essential to the creation of a
jury issue. Furthermore, as stated in the preceding section, there is
simply no need for special standards of measurement for passing
upon motions for directed verdicts where presumptions are in-
volved. The trial judge need only decide whether the opponent of
the presumption has introduced enough proof to convince him
119 E.g., Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co. v. Hewlett, 307 Ky. 171, 210
S.W.2d 352 (1948); Commonwealth Life Ins. Co. v. Caudills Adm'r, 266 Ky.
581, 99 S.W.2d 745 (1936); Modem Woodmen of America v. Hurford, 193 Ky.
50,9235 S.W. 24 (1921).
120 Duncan v. Clore, 189 Ky. 132, 135, 224 S.W. 678, 680 (1920).
121See, e.g., Modem Woodmen of America v. Hurford, 193 Ky. 50, 235
S.W. 24 (1921); Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co. v. Martin, 108 Ky. 11, 55 S.W.
694 (1900).
122 Columbia Life Ins. Co. v. Perrys Admx, 252 Ky. 793, 796, 68 S.W.2d
393, 394 (1934).
123 Id. Accord, Commonwealth Life Ins. Co. v. Wood's Adm'x, 263 Ky. 361,
92 S.W.2d 351 (1936).124 Id. Accord, Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Edelen's Ex'x, 308 Ky. 455, 214
S.W.2d 769 (1948); Commonwealth Life Ins. Co. v. Caudill's Admr, 266 Ky.
581, 99 S.W.2d 745 (1936).
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that no reasonable juror could find the existence of the presumed
fact.
The second problem that has arisen in applying this pre-
sumption concerns jury instructions. Its source is the case of
Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co. v. Martin.12 5 In this case the Court
of Appeals ruled that juries should be instructed that this pre-
sumption exists and should be considered along with the evidence
in deciding the death issue. The manner in which juries were to
weigh this principle of law against evidence was not mentioned.
The Court may have intended only that the persuasive force of
the basic facts be weighed against the evidence tending to disprove
the presumed fact. But since the jury could be expected to do this
without mention of the presumption, more must have been in-
tended. The unsoundness of an instruction such as this is sup-
ported by the Court of Appeals' subsequent action. Although the
Martin case has not been expressly overruled, none of the more
recent cases provide for an instruction on the presumption of
death.12 6 At least one case has indicated by implication that such
an instruction would be improper. 2 7
F. Presumption That A Properly Mailed Letter
Is Received in Due Course
By showing that a communication was properly addressed,
stamped, and deposited in the mail, a party may invoke a pre-
sumption that the addressee received the communication in due
course. 1 In a typical imprecise manner, the Court of Appeals has
described the procedural operation of this presumption as follows:
If ... [the basic facts] are proved the presumption will
arise, with the burden cast on the sendee to prove that he
never received the communication, or the information that
it contained from any authorized source. 29
125108 Ky. 11, 55 S.W. 694 (1900).
126 See, e.g., Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co. v. Hewlett, 807 Ky. 171, 210
S.W.2d 852 (1948); Hill's Adm'x v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 240 Ky. 172, 41
S.W.2d 935 (1981); Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Louisville Trust Co., 207 Ky. 654,
269 S.W. 1014 (1925).127Pacific Mut. Ins. Co. v. Meade, 281 Ky. 86, 184 S.W.2d 960 (1939).
128 See, e.g., Commonwealth Life Ins. Co. v. Gault's Adm'rs, 256 Ky. 625,
76 S.W.2d 618 (1934); Proctor v. Ray, 194 Ky. 746, 240 S.W. 1068 (1922).129 Executive Comm. of Christian Educ. and Ministerial Relief for the
Presbyterian Church of the United States v. Fidelity & Columbia Trust Co., 278
Ky. 715, 720, 117 S.W.2d 958, 960 (1938). Accord, Benefit Ass'n of Ry. Em-
ployees v. Hancock, 248 Ky. 815, 58 S.W.2d 578 (1988).
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As stated before, the reason behind this presumption is solely the
balance of probability in favor of the presumed fact which flows
naturally from the basic facts. Since this probability may be
properly assessed by a jury along with the rebuttal evidence, this
presumption should impose upon its opponent only the burden of
going forward with evidence. It is this "burden" which is referred
to in the above statement.
The difficulty experienced with this presumption in Ken-
tucky has occurred when its opponent has attempted to satisfy the
burden shifted to him by offering nothing more than his own
denial of receipt of the communication. On several occasions, the
Court of Appeals has described the effect of such a rebuttal to be
this:
[W]here there was a denial that a letter was received,
and the mailing of the letter is the only evidence of service,
the party upon whom the burden is cast of showing that a
notice was given must fail of his proof. 30
Under this ruling, denial of the existence of the presumed fact by
the opponent serves to satisfy his burden of going forward with
proof as well as to shift that burden back to the proponent of the
presumption. The difficulty of conceiving a situation in which
the presumption would be invoked in the absence of a denial of
receipt by the opposing party casts doubt upon the soundness of
this ruling. If a simple denial is sufficient to completely overcome
the presumption, then in effect, it performs no procedural function
at all. (It would not even achieve what is designated on Figure 1
as the 30 percent probability level.)
In its more recent decisons, the Court of Appeals has assigned
this presumption a greater procedural importance:
According to the weight of authority, the rule is that when
it is shown that a letter has been properly mailed to a person,
the presumption is that the addressee received such letter, and
if he denies having received same such denial does not entirely
destroy such presumption, and it may be considered as evi-
dence by the court or jury trying the case. 31
130 Home Ins. Co. v. Roll, 187 Ky. 31, 85, 218 S.W. 471, 473 (1920). Accord,
Campbell v. Snyder, 287 Ky. 596, 154 S.W.2d 724 (1941); H. C. Whitmer Co.
v. McClung, 247 Ky. 625, 57 S.W.2d 648 (1933); Benge's Admr v. Eversole,
156 Ky. 131, 160 S.W. 911 (1913).131 Meyers v. Brown-Forman Distillery Co., 289 Ky. 185, 195, 158 S.W.2d
407, 412 (1942). Accord, Beauchamp v. Commonwealth ex. rel. Ky. Bd. of
Veterinary Examiners, 243 S.W.2d 879 (Ky. 1951).
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With this interpretation, the opponent's denial of receipt satisfies
his burden of going forward with evidence but does not shift that
burden back to the proponent of the presumption. A jury issue is
created with the proponent having the risk of non-persuasion.
This treatment is consistent with the interpretation of this pre-
sumption in most jurisdictions.
G. Presumptions Without Basic Facts
Several principles of legal presumptions cannot be made to
fit neatly into the definition of a presumption provided above be-
cause the presumed fact arises from a "situation" rather than from
"proved facts." The most important of these principles are the
presumption of innocence, the presumption of sanity, and the pre-
sumption against suicide. The procedural consequence accorded
these presumptions merits brief consideration.
1. Presumption of Innocence.-When an accused makes his
initial appearance in a courtroom he arrives under a cloud of
suspicion 32 and faces the unappealing task of defending himself
against the power and resources of the state. Because of this
"situation," the law has perceived a need to cloak him with a
presumption of innocence which, being a presumption, should
in its procedural operation relate to the burden of proof concept.
This, however, is not possible. Both responsiblities of this concept
are imposed upon the prosecution independent of the operation of
the presumption of innocence. From the instant that an accused
is charged with criminal conduct, the state must bear the re-
sponsibility of going forward with evidence on the question of
guilt, and in the end must bear the risk of non-persuasion. Con-
sequently, the only function left for the presumption of in-
nocence, once a case is ready for trial, is to serve as a caution
to the decision-makers that an accused should not suffer from
"suspicion, conjection, and mere appearances,"' 33 and that guilt
should not be inferred from his arrest and indictment. Very few
courts have confined its procedural consequences to the per-
132 The actual existence of this suspicion has been established by laboratory
experimentation. An experiment performed by two psychologists verified that "the
mere indictment created a slight tendency to regard the defendant as guilty."
Weld & Roff, A Study in the Formation of Opinion Based Upon Legal Evidence,
51 Am. J. OF PSYCHOL. 609, 622 (1938).13P. THAYER, A Pn mmqnY TEATisE oNq EvscE AT THE COmmON LAw
8-52 (1898).
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formance of this task.134 Instead, most have chosen to give it some
special functional value which requires that it be submitted in
some manner to the jury for consideration along with the
evidence. Efforts to describe this value have resulted in a great
number of confusing and uncertain judicial decisions.
Probably the most important of these is the Supreme Court
case of Coffin v. United States.135 At the trial level, the judge con-
strued the presumption of innocence to be the reason for, or
synonymous with, the principle which imposes upon the prosecu-
tion the risk of non-persuasion. 13 6 Thus, he instructed the jury that
the prosecution was obligated to establish guilt beyond a reason-
able doubt, but refused to specifically mention the presumption of
innocence. 137 In rejecting this construction, the Supreme Court
conceived the presumption to be an "instrument of proof created
by the law in favor of one accused,' 13 and decided that the jury
should be instructed that this instrument is a part of the evidence
for the accused and must be considered as such in deciding the
question of guilt or innocence. 139 With this decision, the Court ap-
parently intended that the presumption be an arbitrary determina-
tion that the accused was probably innocent and that this deter-
mination in some manner be placed in the imaginary scales of
justice to be weighed with the evidence. Two years later, the
Supreme Court altered the Coffin decision, but only with respect
to its ruling that the jury should be instructed that the presump-
tion of innocence is evidence. It was thought that this instruction
'34 See, e.g., Kindle v. State, 174 Ark. 1179, 297 S.W. 827 (1927); Monk v.
State, 180 Ark. 364, 197 S.W. 580 (1917); McKenna v. State, 119 Fla. 588, 161
So. 561, 564 (1934) (concurring opinion); Swango v. Commonwealth, 291 Ky.
690, 165 S.W.2d 182 (1942); Commonwealth v. Devlin, 335 Mass. 55, 141
N.E.2d 269 (1957); Carr v. State, 192 Miss. 152, 4 So. 887 (1941); State v.
Lizotte, 109 Vt. 378, 197 A. 396 (1988).
'35 156 U.S. 432 (1895).
'136 Professor Wigmore's analysis of the presumption of innocence was similar
to that of the trial judge in the Coffin case. He concluded that this presumption
"is in truth merely another form of expression for .. .the rule that it is for the
prosecution to adduce evidence... , and to produce persuasion beyond a reason-
able doubt." 9 WGMoRE § 2511.
13 7 The instruction refused by the trial judge was framed as follows:
The law presumes that persons charged with crime are innocent until
they are proven by competent evidence to be guilty. To the benefit of
this presumption the defendants are all entitled, and this presumption
stands as their sufficent protection unless it has been removed by evidence
proving their guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 452 (1895).
138 Id. at 459.
139 Id. at 461.
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tended to mislead.140 The Court, however, maintained its position
that the presumption does more than merely reemphasize that the
burden of proof is on the prosecution. It was still thought to be
"an instrument of proof.' 4'
With this reasoning as a foundation, the federal courts have
developed two principles to govern the procedural operation of
this presumption. The first requires that the presumption attend
the accused throughout the trial, without regard to the persua-
siveness of the evidence contrary to the presumed fact.142 The
second requires that, in deciding the issue of guilt or innocence,
jurors must consider the presumption along with the evidence and
weigh the evidence in light of it. 1 43 State courts, with few ex-
ceptions,144 have adopted the reasoning of the Supreme Court, and
have treated the presumption of innocence as something entirely
distinct from the principle which requires the prosecution to
establish guilt.145 The Court of Appeals of Kentucky is one of the
exceptions. Its treatment of the presumption of innocence has been
described in this way:
While this instruction [i.e., that the, 'law presumes the
the defendant to be innocent until proven guilty'] fairly
140 See Agnew v. United States, 165 U.S. 86 (1897). In referring to an
instruction that the presumption of innocence must be considered as evidence for
the accused, the Supreme Court remarked that "the [trial court] might well have
declined to give it, on the ground of the tendency of its closing sentence to mis-
lead." Id. at 52. In a subsequent case, Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245
(1910), the Court made its position more definite, and it is now well recognized
in federal courts that an instruction that the presumption of innocence is evidence
is not required. See, e.g., Harrell v. United States, 220 F.2d 516 (5th Cir. 1955);
United States v. Nimerick, 118 F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1941).
141 Kirby v. United States, 174 U.S. 47, 55 (1899).
142 United States v. Fleischman, 339 U.S. 349 (1950); Kirby v. United States,
174 U.S. 47 (1899); Pannell v. United States, 230 F.2d 698 (D.C. Cir. 1963);
Shaw v. United States, 244 F.2d 930 (9th Cir. 1957); Curley v. United States,
160 F.2d 229 (D.C. Cir. 1946); United States v. Foster, 9 F.R.D. 367 (S.D.N.Y.
1949).
143 E.g., McAffee v. United States, 105 F.2d 21 (D.C. Cir. 1939); Mildencie
v. United States, 62 F.2d 1045 (3d Cir. 1938); Lisansky v. United States, 31
F.2d 846 (4th Cir. 1929); Dodson v. United States, 23 F.2d 401 (4th Cir 1928);
United States v. Foster, 9 F.R.D., 367 (S.D.N.Y. 1949).
144 See, e.g., State v. Hayes, 127 Conn. 543, 18 A.2d 895 (1941); State v.
Gardner, 112 Conn. 121, 151 A. 349 (1930); State v. Demag, 118 Vt. 273, 108
A.2d 390 (1954).
145 See, e.g., Robertson v. State, 36 Ala. A pp. 117, 53 So. 2d 575, (1951);
Davis v. State, 90 So. 2d 629 (Fla. 1956); People v. Coulson, 12 Ill. 2d 290, 149
N.E.2d 96 (1958); Osborn v. State, 199 Ind. 44, 154 N.E. 865 (1927); State
v. Harvey, 228 N.C. 62, 44 S.E.2d 472 (1947).
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presents the law, it is more favorable to the defendant than
he was entitled to have. This instruction should always follow
... these words:
0 * 0
'If there be a reasonable doubt of the defendant being
proven to be guilty, he is entitled to an acquittal.'
0 0 * 0
The court should not tell the jury that the law presumes
the innocence of a defendant.146
The reason for this type of instruction has never been clearly ex-
pressed. But, from this statement and others like it,147 one easily
concludes that the Court conceives the presumption of innocence
to be synonymous with the principle which requires the pro-
secution to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. On other
occasions, however, the Court has given a different reason for not
instructing the jury as to the existence of this presumption. It has
stated that such an instruction would violate the prohibition
against comment on the value of evidence by the judge.148 What-
ever the reason, the Kentucky Court's interpretation is consistent
with the classification of this principle as a "rebuttable pre-
sumtion"' 49 and with the reasoning of Wigmore and Morgan that
the untrained mind of a juror is not capable of accurately apply-
ing any presumption to the judgment process.
2. Presumption of Sanity.-The presumption of sanity is
another of the presumptions which may be used in the absence
of "proved facts." It may be invoked in a civil or criminal case as
soon as an issue of insanity is raised. The reason for its existence
usually has been asserted to be a balance of probability in favor
of the presumed fact. On occasion another reason has been sug-
gested:
The plea of insanity is peculiarly open to abuse. It is often
resorted to in extremity. It opens a wide range of inquiry.
Facts to support are easily manufactured. It invites the jury
146 Brown v. Commonwealth, 198 Ky. 663, 664-65, 249 S.W. 777, 778
(128).
147 See, e.g., Pack v. Commonwealth, 287 Ky. 192, 152 S.W. 600 (1941);
Nickells v. Commonwealth, 241 Ky. 159, 43 S.W.2d 697 (1931); Keith v. Com-
monwealth, 195 Ky. 635, 243 S.W. 293 (1922).
148 Goodwin v. Commonwealth, 214 Ky. 422, 283 S.W. 420 (1926); Minniard
v. Commonwealth 158 Ky. 210, 164 S.W. 804 (1914).149 E.g., Bradford v. United States, 129 F.2d 274 (5th Cir. 1942); Morgan,
Presumptions, 12 WAsH. L. BEv. 254 (1937); Subrin, Presumptions and Their
Treatment Under the Law of Ohio, 26 Omo ST. L.J. 175 (1965).
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into a field of speculation, where they are likely, by means of
conflicting expert testimony and opposing and uncertain
opinions, to become lost in doubt and confusion, and their
verdict often a matter of mere conjecture. 150
For one or both of these reasons, courts have decided that the
decision-maker whose mind is in equipoise should "be required to
find for the usual rather than the unusual."'' 51 (Sanity is deemed
the usual, insanity the unusual.) This has been achieved by pre-
suming every man sane until the contrary is shown and by using
this presumption to "place the burden of showing insanity upon
the party who relies upon it"' 5 as a matter of defense.
In civil cases the Court of Appeals has experienced no difficulty
with this presumption. It has been used to shift the two responsi-
bilities of the burden of proof concept to the party who pleads in-
sanity as an element of his case. 53 In criminal cases its application
has been more difficult because the situation is the same as that
which exists with the presumption of innocence. Both the burden
of going forward with evidence and the risk of non-persuasion are
imposed upon an accused independent of the presumption of
sanity. In allocating the burden of proof in criminal cases, the
Court of Appeals has always held that if an accused relies upon
some separate matter of defense "wholly disconnected from the
body of the particular offense charged, and constituting a distinct
affirmative defense," he must bear the burden of establishing that
defense.154 Insanity is one of those classified as a "distinct affirm-
ative defense."' 55 This classification has made it impossible for the
presumption of sanity to affect the burden of proof responsibilities,
and has resulted in the Court treating this presumption as no
other is treated.
Without distinguishing its principle that juries should never be
instructed as to presumptions, the Court of Appeals has con-
150 Cannon v. Commonwealth, 243 Ky. 302, 310, 47 S.W.2d 1075, 1078
(1932).
151 Morgan, Some Observations Concerning Presumptions, 44 I-H~v. L. REv.
906 (1931).
152 Cannon v. Commonwealth, 243 Ky. 302, 310, 47 S.W.2d 1075, 1078
(1932).
153 E.g., Nagle v. Wakefield's Adm'r, 263 S.W.2d 127 (Ky. 1953).
( 54 Commonwealth v. Gentry, 261 Ky. 264, 564, 566, 88 S.W.2d 273, 274
(1935). Accord, Phillips v. Commonwealth, 248 Ky. 665, 59 S.W.2d 579 (1933);
Ball v. Commonwealth, 81 Ky. 662 (1884).
155 E.g., Tunget v. Commonwealth, 303 Ky. 834, 198 S.W.2d 785 (1946);
Guiley v. Commonwealth, 284 Ky. 98, 143 S.W.2d 1059 (1940); Ball v. Common-
wealth, 81 Ky. 662 (1884).
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sistently approved instructions in criminal cases which state that
"every man is presumed sane until the contrary is shown."' 56 This
is the only presumption presently presented to juries in Kentucky.
By approving such instructions, the Court is apparently attempting
to "implement the policy behind the presumption by inviting the
jury to weigh it, in some manner not easy to understand or arti-
culate, as they would a part of the evidence."' 57 The fault with
such instructions is in their redundancy. The policy of the pre-
sumption is implemented through the imposition upon the ac-
cused of the burden of proof on the insanity issue. It has no other
function to perform, certainly not one which requires jurors to
undertake the difficult psychological task of weighing a creation of
the law on the same scales in which they weigh evidence.
3. Presumption Against Suicide.-This presumption, like that
of sanity, is based upon a balance of probability in favor of the
presumed fact. Absent evidence to the contrary, we know that
"a person possesses a love of life, and the instinct to preserve it,"u58
and that he will not voluntarily do anything that imperils his own
life. Despite the identical reason for their existence, the pre-
sumption of sanity (as applied in civil cases) and the presump-
tion against suicide are accorded different procedural treatment.
The former serves to shift both responsibilities of the burden of
proof concept to its opponent while the latter serves to shift only
the burden of going forward with the evidence. 5 9 Once this bur-
den is satisfied by the oponent, the presumption against suicide
disappears from the case with the proponent having the responsi-
bility of persuading the jury as to the occurrence of suicide. Per-
haps this distinction is justified by the difference that exists in the
issues upon which the two presumptions operate. Although both
"suicide" and "insanity" issues involve the state of a person's
mind, the suicide issue is more susceptible of proof from external
circumstances and, therefore, easier to prove.
156 E.g., Terry v. Commonwealth, 871 S.W.2d 862 (Ky. 1968); Murrell v.
Commonwealth, 2 1, Ky. 65, 163 S.W.2d 1 (1942); Mathley v. Commonwealth,
120 Ky. 389, 86 S.W. 988 (1905).
'57 James, Burdens of Proof, 47 VA. L. REv. 51 (1961).
158 Kentucky Home Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Watts, 298 Ky. 471, 475, 188
S.W.2d 499, 501 (1944). Accord, Illinois C.R. v. Applegate's Adm'x, 268 Ky.
458, 105 S.W.2d 153 (1936); Owen Motor Freight Lines v. Russells Adm'r, 260
Ky. 795, 86 S.W.2d 708 (1935).
159 Thelen v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 261 S.W.2d 427 (Ky. 1953); Kentucky
Home Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Watts, 298 Ky. 471, 183 S.W.2d 499 (1944).
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V. CONCLUSION
Writers with sufficient patience to undertake a discussion of the
law of presumptions have generally begun or concluded with an
apologetic statement which sounds something like this: "Every
writer of sufficient intelligence to appreciate the difficulties of the
subject matter has approached the topic of presumptions with a
sense of hopelessness and has left it with a feeling of despair."' 60
A discussion of the Kentucky law of presumptions cannot be con-
cluded with a different "feeling." It seems appropriate, therefore,
to finish by demonstrating the need for such an apology. In Ken-
tucky, the recent case of Lee v. Tucker' 61 provides that demonstra-
tion. This case involved a traffic accident in which both occupants
of a car were killed when that car crossed into the wrong lane
of a highway and collided with a truck. The personal representa-
tive of the owner of the car was sued by the personal representa-
tive of the other occupant, who happened to be the owner's
daughter. The claim was for wrongful death, and the only issue
in the case was whether the owner or his daughter was driving at
the time of the accident.
As a consequence of the impact of the vehicles, both occupants
of the car had been thrown out the right front door, and no
witness could testify as to who was driving at the time of the col-
lision. Each had been observed driving on the day in question, the
owner nearest in time to the accident. The only other proof offered
on this issue was that the owner had a heart condition and that
the daughter frequently drove the vehicle when the two were
together. On the basis of this evidence, the case was submitted to
the jury with a special interrogatory requiring that the jury state
whether they could decide who was driving the vehicle at the time
of collision. When this interrogatory was answered in the negative,
the trial court dismissed the plaintiff's claim. On appeal, the
question presented for decision was whether the plaintiffs evi-
dence (ownership of the vehicle plus the testimony that the owner
was the one last seen driving prior to the collision) created a
160 Morgan, Presumptions, 12 WAsH. L. Rlv. 255 (1987). Accord, Subrin,
Presumptions and Their Treatment Under the Law of Ohio, 26 Omao ST. L.J. 175
(1965). See Laughlin, In Support of The Thayer Theory of Presumptions, 52
MIcH. L. R~v. 195 (1958); Reaugh, Presumptions and the Burden of Proof, 86
ILL. L. REV. 708 (1942).
161 865 S.W.2d 849 (Ky. 1968).
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"presumption" which served to shift to the defendant the burden
of proof (meaning by this the risk of non-persuasion) on the issue
of identity. If so, the jury's answer to the interrogatory would have
compelled a verdict for the plaintiff.
In approving the trial courts decision, the Court of Appeals
first distinguished what it conceived to be the two major legal
concepts involved, "permissible inference" and "rebuttable pre-
sumption":
The terms 'inference" and 'presumption' are merely de-
scriptive of the weight given to circumstantial evidence as a
matter of law in particular instances. The legal effect given
to any evidence should and usually does depend on the
degree of probability -eflected by it. If it is accorded the
dignity of a presumption it should not be because a wooden
rule puts it in that category, but only because it is that persua-
sive. . . . Circumstantial evidence has no magic quality.
It is measured by the same standards of probity and credi-
bility as direct evidence. 162 (Emphasis added).
With this statement, and others which followed it, the Court
indicated quite dearly that in its collective judgment, the only
difference between an inference and a presumption is that the
latter represents a greater persuasive force of circumstantial evi-
dence than the former. The Court further indicated that any set
of circumstances in any case could create a presumption if the
court should decide that those circumstances have the necessary
persuasive power. Any doubt as to the Court's intention in respect
to these two conclusions was eliminated by what was described as
the "holding" of the case:
We hold that when the probative force of a plaintiff's
evidence is such that in the absence of further proof he is en-
titled to a directed verdict . . ., he has established a rebut-
table presumption. This places on the defendant the practical
necessity (which, to avoid confusion, ought not to be referred
to as a 'burden') of going forward with proof if he would
avoid a preemptory, but it does not shift the burden of proof
in the sense that he loses if the jury cannot decide the issue
one way or the other. His rebutting evidence will reduce the
presumption to the status of a permissible inference if it in-
jects enough doubt that the jury may reasonably decide that
the plaintiff has not proved his case.168
162 Id. at 851.
163 d. at 852.
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This case is not unique in its misuse of the term "pre-
sumption," except in one sense. There was simply no need to use
or misuse the "presumption" concept in this situation. The Court
needed only to decide which party should bear the risk of non-
persuasion on the identity issue. By involving the "presumption"
device in the decision, the Court of Appeals added to the already
confused state of the law in several ways. Most significantly per-
haps, the Court disregarded the need to confine the use of the
term "presumption" to those well-defined, often-used, principles
of law which attach to specific evidentiary facts (known as "basic
facts") specific procedural consequences as to the production of
other evidence. Also the Court has restated its position, which is
not even consistent with its own past decisions, that all pre-
sumptions are based in policy upon the persuasive force of their
basic facts, not upon "a wooden rule." And, finally, the Court has
bestowed upon the term "rebuttable presumption" a function that
has always been performed adequately by the "burden of going
forward with evidence," viz., to allocate to one of the litigants,
under threat of an adverse ruling, the responsibility of producing
evidence on the propositions in issue. It is too much to expect that
this article would eliminate the confusion represented by the case
of Lee v. Tucker. If it does not add to this confusion, then possibly
a useful step has been taken.
